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Abstract
In many developing countries the privatisation of state owned enterprises is receiving
increased attention but the selling of the enterprises is difficult. In Eritrea  state owned
enterprises were offered for sale at the end of 1996, but many of the relatively large companies
are not privatised yet. This created the possibility to study the impact of slow privatisation in a
developing country. After the privatisation announcement the state owned enterprises in both
the profitable beverage industry as well as in the unprofitable textile industry showed negative
effects on profitability. Moreover, managers in both industries complained about slow
privatisation, but the complaints were different. In the profitable beverage industry
privatisation frustrated the orientation on the future because the privatisation authorities
restricted investments. The managers of the loss making textile industry were more involved
with survival and they complained about the long duration of privatisation that made it
impossible to get outside financing quickly.
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1. Introduction
The concept of privatisation can have various meanings [Starr, 1988], but if applied to
developing countries the word "privatisation" generally implies a shift of ownership
of companies from the state to the private sector. The intended shift of ownership
stems from a multitude of reasons [United Nations, 1996; Megginson and Netter,
2000], but two major general economic reasons are the endeavour to create a more
efficient economy as well as the need to alleviate governmental budgetary problems.
Privatisation is therefore frequently propagated when bad economic conditions, high
foreign debt, high dependence on international agencies and budget deficits prevail
[Ariyo and Jerome, 1999; Ramamurti, 1992; Yarrow, 1999]. These economic
circumstances may thus make privatisation urgent and some authors propagate a fast
privatisation of state owned enterprises [Boyko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996;
Donaldson and Wagle, 1995; Bennell, 1997]. Other authors, however, propagate a
gradual approach to privatisation, because the gain from hasty privatisation should be
compared with the social costs of speed [Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Katz and
Owen, 1995] and because a speedy privatisation can result in poorly conceived
privatisation schemes [Ramamurti, 1999].
In general, urgency is high in developing countries, and many of these
countries started privatisation programs. However, a weak regulatory framework, an
ineffective private sector, a low level of domestic savings and the absence of an
adequate stock market diminish the ease of privatisation in these countries [Ariyo and
Jerome, 1999]. Urgency, moreover, does not attract investors. Potential buyers only
consider purchasing unprofitable companies if they are allowed to restructure them
and to lay-off workers. Governments, at the other hand, hesitate to give carte blanche
to a buyer, because asset stripping reduces the value of the company to the country
and the firing of employees generates unemployment. Sometimes even profitable
companies cannot be sold fast because governments do not like to sell profitable
companies at low prices and the search for the highest bidder may take time.
In Eritrea the aforementioned conflicts of interest between potential buyers
and the government slowed the pace of privatisation and both profitable and
unprofitable companies listed for privatisation became stuck in a long-term
privatisation period. The lack of privatisation success, however, made it possible to3
study companies during the process of privatisation. Because slow privatisation is not
yet studied in depth at the level of the firm one may learn what aspects are relevant
for a company during a long privatisation period in a developing country. Because
both profitable and unprofitable companies were offered for sale in Eritrea, it was
also possible to see whether differences between profitable and unprofitable
companies during an extended period of privatisation could be found.
This article highlights the Eritrean privatisation policy and the direct
privatisation results in section 2. Then it presents the companies studied and the case
study approach in section 3. Section 4 compares the developments for state-owned
and private enterprises as well as the development of profitability in two industries
before and after the announcement of privatisation. Section 5 gives the reactions of
company managers on privatisation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Privatisation in Eritrea
Prior to 1975, Eritrea had a flourishing private industrial sector accounting for 40 %
of the industrial output of Ethiopia [GOE, 1994, p.4]. In 1975, the Marxist
government of Ethiopia adopted a command economic system and nationalised large
manufacturing enterprises. During the period 1975-1991 it neglected the factories and
drained their resources without giving necessary inputs to develop the industries.
When in 1991 Eritrea became an independent country, the new government adopted a
free market policy to resuscitate the economy.
The government of Eritrea began to sell small co-operative shops in 1992 and
returned nationalised houses and other buildings to their former owners. In 1995 the
Eritrean government established the National Agency for the Supervision and
Privatisation of Public Enterprises (NASPPE) to reduce the number of public
enterprises. The objectives of NASPPE are to privatise public enterprises and to
implement appropriate management policies in order to vitalise productivity and to
establish a competitive and conducive economic ambience in all public enterprises
[GOE, 1995, p.4]. At the end of 1996, the NASPPE announced that 39 of the 42
publicly owned manufacturing enterprises should be privatised. Moreover, one of the4
formerly nationalised companies was liquidated, while two were not offered for sale
because the government considered them as strategic.
The NASPPE has been using a direct sales method. Usually, companies are
advertised in local as well as international newspapers such as The Economist.
Enterprises are auctioned and investors bid for the companies. The NASPPE
evaluates the price offered and the business plans of investors regarding investments,
technology transfer and job creation and then makes its decision.
Table 1 shows the companies sold in each sector as well as the number of
enterprises owned by the state in June 1999 and some of the company characteristics.
__________________
Table 1 about here
__________________
Table 1 shows the direct consequences for the sale of 18 companies until June
1999. In these companies 1,681 employees (22%) were employed, while 5.797
employees (78%) were with companies still to be privatised. The Eritrean government
raised 156.2 million from the sales of the enterprises Nakfa (1 Nakfa may be equalled
to 0.14 US dollar). 52.7 million Nakfa (34% of the total value) was received from the
sale of Gash Cigarette Factory. The other 17 companies were sold for 103.5 million
Nakfa.
Table 1 also indicates that the enterprises sold are relatively small and that
relatively large manufacturing companies are still owned by the state. The metal and
wood products industry and the chemical industry (soap factories) were privatising
fast. Food, textiles, leather and shoe and non-metallic minerals (cement and salt
factories) companies were less easily privatised. In fact, some of these companies
were already offered for sale three or four times but are not sold yet. This was due to
the fact that they did not attract investors or because the government did not accept
the bid price and/or the business plan.5
3. Data and case study approach
In order to find the effects of a long privatisation period, we used a top-down
triangulation approach. First, we present the macro-economic developments before
and after the announcement of privatisation in public and private companies. Because
we also like to learn whether there is a difference between profitable and unprofitable
companies during a protracted privatisation period we compared companies from a
profitable with those from an unprofitable industry. We, however, had to distinguish
the impact of the privatisation announcement from the impact of the increasing
trouble with the neighbouring country of Ethiopia in the research period. Therefore
we searched for a profitable industry with minor exports. That industry proved to be
the beverage industry. The industry with overall company losses was the textile
industry. The textile industry had been dependent on exports to Ethiopia in the past,
but the main impact of Ethiopian export reductions was already visible in the annual
accounts far before the textile companies were slated for privatisation. In fact the
disappearance of export possibilities contributed to a large extent to the losses in the
textile industry since 1993, while the fieldwork took place in the period from January
1998 till October 1998. For these reasons companies from the beverage industry were
chosen as well as companies from the textile industry.
In comparison to Table 1 the fourth state-owned company from the textile
industry was left out of the sample, because the auctioning of the company was in
progress during the period of the fieldwork. Therefore we used three companies from
the textile industry and three from the beverage industry (of which two still had to be
sold while the third was a joint venture with a foreign investor). We study the
development in individual companies from annual accounts and we add to this the
opinions of individual managers.
In the privatisation literature opinions of individual managers are often
neglected. This may be caused by the fact that managers are considered as agents of
the state. If the state wants to sell a company, the incumbent managers may be
irrelevant for the future of the company, because they will have a large change of
being dismissed when the company is sold. Nevertheless, if privatisation takes a long
period of time, the incumbent managers are relevant for the company during the
bridging period. Moreover, an analysis of annual accounts gives meagre information6
on why profits are generated or losses occur. Finally, potential purchasers normally
use future oriented business evaluations [Bennell, 1997, p. 1799] besides information
from the annual accounts. But annual accounts are illuminations from the past. They
are not future oriented and they do not indicate how revenue could be increased and
cost reduced: it may often even be necessary to increase outlays in order to generate
more sales, e.g. for marketing or for attracting highly qualified personnel. For these
reasons the elicitation of management knowledge may be more informative than
solely gathering information from annual accounts [Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko,
1996].
Management opinions were collected via open interviews aimed at general,
financial, production and marketing managers of the six companies. The response rate
was 92%. The managers interviewed were asked what efforts were done to improve
company sales and to reduce costs, what constraints were encountered, what further
plans they had in increasing sales or reducing costs and how the privatisation policy
was influencing company operations. The interviews took place at the respondents'
offices.
4. Changes in sales and profitability
The direct privatisation revenues presented in Table 1 do not present a complete
picture of the financial consequences of privatisation to the government. According to
Donaldson and Wagle [1995, p. 36] ‘Enterprises are living things, and deteriorate
very quickly once they are "for sale". It is imperative, therefore, not only to complete
divestitures as quickly as possible, but also to manage the business well in the
interim. While a firm is for sale, key employees doubt the firm's commitment to them,
are less motivated, are attracted to alternative employment….[and the] selling process
is a distraction to management, which is tempted to leave critical matters unattended
because they assume a new owner will take them in hand.’ If Donaldson and Wagle
are correct, we might find negative effects of the privatisation announcement in the
annual accounts of the remaining public companies in 1997 and 1998 (see Table 2).7
__________________
Table 2 about here
__________________
Table 2 indicates that the indirect privatisation consequences may indeed have
been large and negative. The operating profit of all Eritrean companies with more
than 10 employees declined in from 1996 to 1997 from 253 million Nakfa to 163
million Nakfa. It is likely that the reduction in operating profit can be attributed to the
state-owned enterprises. According to Table 2, the previously increasing trend in
value added at factor costs was reversed in public companies. Their value declined
from 315 million Nakfa in 1996 to 270 million Nakfa in 1997, while in the same
period the value added with private companies increased from 37 million Nakfa to
103 million Nakfa.
Even if value added decreases in public companies during a slow privatisation
period, it is not yet clear whether it affects profitable and unprofitable public
companies in the same way. Table 3, therefore, gives additional information on the
sales of the companies to be privatised in the two industries for the period 1992-1998.
__________________
Table 3 about here
__________________
From table 3 we see that in the year after the privatisation announcement the
sales of all six companies studied declined. Moreover, while there was in most
companies a clear upward trend until 1996, that trend reversed in 1997. In four
companies the situation deteriorated even further in 1998 and in the aggregate sales in
both the beverage industry and the textile industry declined during two consecutive
years. The decline was however smaller in the beverage industry than in the textile
industry. In comparison to the highest amount of sales in 1996 the sales in the
profitable beverage industry declined with 12% in the first year after the privatisation
announcement and with 2% the year thereafter. These percentages were respectively
20 and 24 for the loss generating textile industry. The latter figure suggests that the8
long term effect of slow privatisation may be worse in unprofitable industries, but
such a conclusion does not hold if we consider company profits (see Table 4).
__________________
Table 4 about here
__________________
Table 4 shows that all beverage companies were profitable in 1996 and in 1997,
while all companies in the textile industry showed a loss in the same period. In the
year after the announcement of privatisation company 2 showed a small increase in
profits and company 4 reduced its losses, but the profitability in the other four
companies declined. Over a protracted privatisation period the textile industry losses
reduced in 1998 in comparison to 1997, while the profits of the beverage industry
declined further in 1998.
Though the effects are mixed among the companies and the industries for
1998, information from 1997 and 1998 suggests that both profit and loss generating
industries may be affected negatively if the privatisation announcement is not
followed by the relief of companies actually being sold
5. Managers on privatisation
We interviewed managers of the six firms in order to learn where the differences in
profitability came from and what privatisation meant for their company. It proved that
the textile industry was less profitable than the beverage industry because with the
textiles there was less demand for the products, less selling experience, less
flexibility, a higher cost structure and more competition. Despite the differences in
profitability, managers from both industries were united in two respects with respect
to privatisation. Firstly, the managers did not complain about the fact that their
company was slated for privatisation. In general they supported the idea that
privatisation would be good for the company and the country. Secondly, managers
from both industries complained about the slow speed of privatisation. In this sense,
the qualitative interviews with the managers also indicate the reasons for the negative9
quantitative developments in the annual accounts after the privatisation
announcement. In particular, we found disengagement and a loss of future
orientedness within the companies.
The disengagement with the employees and the managers due to the slow
pace of privatisation was phrased by the production manager of the Asmara Wine and
Liquor Factory in the following way:  "People have become disinterested due to
privatisation. They say the factory will be sold. So there is no need for working hard
or for future planning.... The enterprises management team used to meet monthly but
now -since we heard that the company is to be privatised- we never meet".
Privatisation diminished the orientation on the future too and the marketing manager
of the Asmara Wine and Liquor Factory phrased the influence of privatisation on
company operations as follows: "Privatisation does not help in future planning. Also
the people do not work on full mentality and they do not have any vision at the
moment because their future is not secure."
Despite agreement upon the merits of privatisation and unity in
condemning the slow pace of privatisation, there were also differences
between the managers from the two types of industry. The different
(profitability) backgrounds of the companies caused differences in reference
frames and focus during the protracted privatisation process. For example,
managers in the profitable beverage industry do see potential for direct
improvements, while the managers of the textile industry only see a future for
the company if it will be privatised. The general manager of the Asmara
Brewery said: "In 1995 we started a renovation project, but the NASPPE has
stopped us from enacting the second phase on the ground that -if the factory is
to be sold- we should leave it to the new buyer to choose any kind of
investment...". The production manager of the Eritrean Textile Factory at the
other hand assumed that his company should be privatised before innovation
could take place: "We expect to privatise the company and hope that this will
bring new technology". In fact the textile industry may even expect a financial
impulse from the new owner as phrased by the financial manager of the Eritrea
Textile Factory " The delay of privatisation is aggravating the financial
problem of the company. ... Had there been an ownership change, the new
buyer would have injected new finances..."10
Moreover, the managers in the beverage industry were more oriented to
investments, while the managers of the textile industry were struggling for survival by
reducing costs. This gave a different focus to their ideas about where to look for
improvements. For example, the marketing manager of the Asmara Wine and Liquor
Factory stated: "We had a plan to introduce automatic machines and to improve sales
but due to privatisation we do not have any plans", while the general manager of the
Eritrea Textile Factory at the other hand said: " If the company would be privatised,
the new owner could reduce costs by self financing the company and this would
enable the company to become competitive in the market". In fact the managers of the
textile industry may not even dare to think about proposing investments to the
NASPPE. The general manager of the Eritrea Textile Factory, for example, said: " If
we want to invest in fixed assets, we have to present our proposal to the NASPPE. But
due to the losses that we have they will not approve any new fixed asset investment".
In the beverage industry the managers not only complained about the
restrictions imposed on investing in fixed assets, but the NASPPE also restricted the
amount of inventory. Companies were allowed to buy stocks needed for three months
only. This guideline did not affect local purchases, but it created a problem for
foreign purchases. Quite some companies had been buying stocks from foreign
countries on a six months basis because it takes a very long time until deliverance.
The curtailing of stock thus inconvenienced the normal operations of companies. The
general manager of the Asmara Brewery for example said: "When our factory was
offered for privatisation, we were not allowed to keep a large amount of stock. This
was hampering our production. The buyer is obliged to buy the stock at the time of
privatisation. Therefore, in order to minimise the burden on the buyer, we were
restricted to a limited period of inventory. This restriction increases our ordering
costs and since our factory requires a large amount of malt, it creates a problem."
The differences in profitability, reference frame and focus thus resulted in
different complaints about the slow pace of privatisation. The managers from the
beverage industry complained about the restrictions of the NASPPE, while the
managers from the textile industry complained about the long duration itself. Where
the general manager of the Asmara Brewery said "Privatisation has been the main
constraint in upgrading machinery. The Board of the NASPPE does not allow long-
term investments in machinery", the marketing manager of the Eritrean Textile11
factory said: "To solve the problems that the company is facing, the privatisation
process should be accelerated".
6. Summary and conclusion
Privatisation in developing countries is a hot issue. It is assumed to improve the
economic efficiency of the country and to reduce government expenditure on
unprofitable companies. Even profitable companies may be offered for sale for the
cash that it may provide to the government. However, the more a country may need
privatisation, the more difficult actual privatisation may be. Eritrea is no exception.
Its government openly adopted privatisation as a part of a liberalisation policy and at
the end of 1996 39 companies were slated for privatisation. However, mainly small
companies were sold and most large industrial companies remained under state
authority. This offered the opportunity to investigate the effects of a long duration of
privatisation.
The unprofitable Eritrean textile industry had problems with demand, costs,
competition, experience and flexibility and the question arises whether even new
management can make these companies viable. The privatising of these companies
may thus be difficult. At the other hand it should not be too difficult to sell the
profitable beverage companies where the aforementioned problems are much smaller
or non-existent. But the profitable beverage companies were not sold either. After the
privatisation announcement profitability declined in both the beverage and the textile
industry. Moreover, in both industries managers complained about the slow
privatisation process. Their complaints were not based on a disliking of privatisation
in general, but on their interest in the growth and the survival of their company. This
was frustrated, because the protracted selling period created uncertainty and
disengagement and diminished the orientation to the future. In the profitable beverage
industry the slow pace of privatisation frustrated growth because the privatisation
authorities restricted investments. In the unprofitable textile industry managers
complained that the long duration of privatisation made it impossible to get outside
financing quickly.12
Strictly speaking, we cannot extend our findings outside Eritrea, but we
assume that the negative effects may be found in other developing countries where
privatisation is difficult too. Our findings suggest that the process of privatisation
itself can endanger profitability. If privatisation should relieve government budget
deficits, one should not only to take into account the direct cash revenues of selling
companies, but also the negative impact of a long privatisation period. This
conclusion is relevant for profitable as well as for unprofitable companies. Moreover,
outside investors do not only pay cash to the government. New owners may also bring
additional financial resources into the company and -most relevant- they will try to
improve profitability by fostering (new) authorities, trust and an orientation to the
future. In order to break an inherent vicious circle, the privatising of profitable and
unprofitable companies should therefore not take a long time.
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  Table 1. Number and characteristics of manufacturing companies sold or still for















Foods 1 62 5 5 849
Beverages 1 47 8.8 2 627
Tobacco& Matches 1 136 52.7 1 104
Textiles & Fibre 2 731 15.2 4 2,544
Leather & Shoe 1 121 5.4 4 964
Metal&Wood 8 365 36.4 2 109
Non-metal Mineral - - 3 600
Chemicals 4 219 32.7 - -
Total 18 1,681 156.2 21 5,797
Source: information received on request from the NASPPE15
Table 2. Operating profit of all companies and value added at factor costs in













1992 110,733 116 158,866 44 141,681 72 17,185
1993 109,652 121 181,249 45 168,934 76 12,315
1994 106,052 131 184,766 46 163,475 85 21,291
1995 217,477 138 302,137 46 278,010 92 24,127
1996 253,438 157 352,087 46 315,212 111 36,875
1997 163,321 205 373,333 46 270,227 159 103,106
Source, State of Eritrea Ministry of Trade and Industry, Report on Census of
Manaufacturing Establishments 1992-1997, Asmara, November 1998, p. 11, 13 and
14.16
Table 3. Sales of the companies investigated in the period 1992 - 1998.
Beverage industry company number Textile industry company number
1 2 3 Total 4 5 6 Total
Year Amounts (*1000 Nakfa)
1992* 25,005 1,234 4,503 30,742 8,561 2,440 2,162 13,163
1993 56,719 1,772 16,606 75,097 12,226 2,502 9,290 24,018
1994 62,769 2,289 20,897 85,955 26,221 9,289 9,381 44,891
1995 125,552 3,153 24,786 153,491 37,541 6,430 6,430 50,401
1996 148,572 4,482 27,751 180,805 39,430 10,232 8,999 58,661
1997 130,764 4,355 24,680 159,799 35,651 6,862 4,322 46,835
1998 131,046 1,809 23,686 156,541 27,482 1,890 6,436 35,808
*For the 1.5 accounting year period 1991/92 we calculated the results on a yearly
basis
Source: annual accounts received on request from the companies
(The company numbers refer to respectively: 1 = Asmara Brewery, 2 = Asmara Wine
and Liquor Factory, 3 = Red See Bottlers, 4 = Asmara Textile Factory, 5 = Eritrea
Textile Factory and 6 = Lalmba Sack Factory)17
Table 4. Operating results of the companies investigated in the period 1992 - 1998.
Beverage industry company number Textile industry company number
1 2 3 Total 4 5 6 Total
Year Amounts (*1000 Nakfa)
1992* 13,703 108 1,834 15,654 773 -81 -390 302
1993 31,364 315 7,306 38,985 -5,245 -2,961 3,268 -4,938
1994 36,134 567 9,117 45,818 -9,524 -938 370 -10,092
1995 68,655 1,226 10,329 80,210 -4,943 -2,932 783 -7,092
1996 73,876 1,765 10,168 85,809 -2,354 -550 -336 -3,240
1997 56,305 1,813 7,856 65,974 -1,801 -2,597 -657 -5,055
1998 45,929 454 5,259 51,642 -4,339 -1,084 868 -4,555
*For the 1.5 accounting year period 1991/92 we calculated the results on a yearly
basis
Source: annual accounts received on request from the companies
(The company numbers refer to respectively: 1 = Asmara Brewery, 2 = Asmara Wine
and Liquor Factory, 3 = Red See Bottlers, 4 = Asmara Textile Factory, 5 = Eritrea
Textile Factory and 6 = Lalmba Sack Factory)